METRO REPLACEMENT OF BRADFIELD, BY DECEITFUL IMPOSITION OF A REDUCED TUNNEL DIAMETER, WITHOUT ELECTORAL OR PARLIAMENTARY LEGITIMISATION
The annihilation of the Rail Union was the general assumption re Berejiklian’s motivation, by the State Press Gallery, if so, this was the worst way to do it and inherently political, so $20 billion should be billed to the Liberal Party.
Christie’s and Greiner’s way was both more productive and lower risk. Showed that the June/July 2012 Berejiklian/IPA/TTF cabal was both dishonest and incompetent.
The media were oblivious, with several reporters culpable of bias. Berejiklian’s bus reforms strengthened the Union, again a sign of political ineptitude.
The deceit has continued with the 2nd Harbour Crossing starting as a double-deck-capable diameter but being reduced to 7 metres, single-deck, the Metro FAQ advice service not knowing when that decision was taken.
The need for due diligence assessments of the 40% suffocation of the Bradfield CityRail network was raised with Turnbull on 8 August 2017 but there has been no visible action from NSW or Fed Treasury, DIRD or iA.
This amounts to maladministration by both Federal and NSW Governments for the reasons explained here and on other pages – Costs Vs Benefits of Berejiklian Bradfield _Reforms_ and NSW Business Cases for Major Project Development Paths
The same principles apply to other Berejiklian fiascos such as the move of the Powerhouse Museum, the Yarra Bay / Airport runways cruise ship terminal, the Parramatta tram (and all other trams), and a muted separate CBD entry for the West Metro – adding massive cost and disruption to cover up Berejiklian’s inability get anything right.
As with the Bankstown, West and other Metros, such specifics have been excluded but should not have been:
- value of travel time savings being 14% of claimed benefits (noting reservations expressed in Peter Self’s “Nonsense on Stilts” and BTE/BTCE reports etc) – pp 64/70 of Bankstown Summary Business Case are inadequate
- effects of high standing ratios over medium-to long commute distances and of station herding mechanisms – after all, the Bankstown station zones were being reconstructed at great expense for such herding without community engagement about loss of the “Australian Way” at suburban locations)
- value of real estate upgradings to private owners – p 73 shows this as productivity but this is very contentious (see AECR critique)
- value of real estate upgradings to UGNSW and other State agencies
- value of consequential financial, operational and strategic damage to the Bradfield heavy rail system
- congestion effects of axial densification and deprivation of “terrace” zones (slight mention on 36 is a waste of space)
- affordability effects of densification v terraces/ medium density
- “heat sink” effects as per UNSW research
- damage to businesses, schools and hospitals, and other important facilities from diversion of services away and/or deprivation of new services available to competitors
- use of train services v seats/passengers due to metros’ publicly questioned capacity.
It is here hypothesised that the farebox revenue is irrelevant to the project and real estate speculation by metro operators and others is the key driver – not revealed in meaningful terms, with the contingent subsidies in the forms of closure of Bradfield lines and investment in underground Melbourne-type trains with no increased capacity, to overseas investors.
That is explored in its various facets at https://sydneyimprovementpolitics.com/josh-crashed, https://sydneyimprovementpolitics.com/josh-myefo-blues, https://sydneyimprovementpolitics.com/%24100-billion-masquerade (as part of PM Morrison’s parallel project psychosis), and https://sydneyimprovementpolitics.com/bairdijiklian-big-lies